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THE “BAD MAN” GOES TO WASHINGTON:
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON
CORPORATE DUTY
Jill E. Fisch*
INTRODUCTION
The Holmesian “bad man” figure has generated extensive commentary.1
Much of this commentary has been critical—berating Oliver Wendell
Holmes for his consequentialist approach to the law and his implication that
legal rules impart no normative content to conduct apart from the costs that
they impose.2 Some scholars have argued flatly that Holmes was wrong,
while others have attempted to rework the bad man into a more sympathetic
creature.
The critics’ central concern is Holmes’s rejection of an independent duty
to obey the law based on moral or ethical principles. Scholars portray the
bad man as exploiting the legal system for his own selfish ends. Ethics
scholars in particular have resisted the implications of Holmes’s approach
for the role of the lawyer, claiming it inappropriately justifies aggressive
representation that stretches the limits of the law and conflicts with its
spirit. Theorists question whether a set of rules can reasonably be called a
legal system if it fails to create obligations to obey and instead merely sets
costs or penalties for noncompliance.3
Perhaps somewhat striking is the absence of the bad man from academic
commentary in corporate law. Although corporations and their executives
* T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am
grateful to the participants in the Fordham Symposium The Internal Point of View in Law
and Ethics, to the faculties of Rutgers-Camden Law School and Florida State Law School,
and to Curtis Bridgeman and Ben Zipursky for their helpful comments.
1. The bad man figure appears in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 991, 993 (1997). The figure and Holmes’s essay have been the subject of
numerous articles, books, and symposia. See, e.g., The Path of the Law and Its Influence:
The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) [hereinafter The
Path of the Law and Its Influence]; Symposium, The Path of the Law 100 Years Later:
Holmes’s Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1 (1997); Symposium, The
Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1997); Symposium, The
Path of the Law Today, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 691 (1998).
2. See, e.g., David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 515, 555-57 (1997)
(describing various academic reactions to the “bad man”).
3. See Abner S. Greene, Against Obligation: A Theory of Permeable Sovereignty 6
(Jan. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and the Fordham Law Review)
(describing conditions under which a set of rules constitutes a legal system).
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have been heavily criticized for their lack of morality, their selfishness, and
their consequentialist approach to regulation, scholars, for the most part,
have not looked to Holmes for insights into corporate decision making.
The exception is scholars in progressive corporate law. These scholars
identify the analogy between the bad man and the amoral corporation and
then look to Holmes’s normative characterization as a justification for
advocating greater corporate social responsibility. Numerous examples of
corporate conduct appear to justify this concern, as corporate actors—from
Standard Oil and the railroads, to today’s WorldCom and Enron—seem to
personify immoral greed at the expense of moral and ethical values.
However, the quest for moral guidance jeopardizes the application of the
bad man to the corporation. Holmes’s bad man could become good if he
acted unselfishly and incorporated the “vaguer sanctions of conscience”
into his behavior.4 The corporation cannot; it lacks an authoritative source
of moral reasoning, leaving it little alternative but to rely on legal rules as
limits on its actions. Reliance on legal limits is problematic, however, in
light of the corporation’s substantial ability to modify these constraints
through political activity. Holmes’s bad man is detached from the legal
system and takes the existing legal rules as fixed, external constraints. The
corporation does not.
Given these differences and, in particular, the mutability of legal rules for
the corporation, does Holmes’s bad man have anything to say with respect
to the appropriate role of the corporation in the political process and the
lawyer who represents that corporation? Although this essay merely offers
preliminary musings, it suggests that potential insights from Holmes have
been overlooked, both in understanding the political process and in
structuring the role of the corporation and its lawyer within that process.
Because there are numerous models and explanations of the Holmesian
bad man, this essay begins in Part I with a brief exploration of the bad man
figure and its applicability to the corporation. Part II considers the role of
the bad man in progressive corporate scholarship and the basis by which the
bad man analogy is used to advocate increased corporate social
responsibility. Part III introduces the role of corporations in the political
process, demonstrating how the corporation, unlike the Holmesian bad man,
actively participates in and affects the creation of the law to which it is
subject. Finally, Part IV considers the implications of the political bad man
and explores how Holmes’s insights can assist in understanding the role of
the corporation and its lawyer in the political process.
I. THE HOLMESIAN BAD MAN
Any in-depth excursion into The Path of the Law and the Holmesian bad
man is clearly beyond the scope of this essay. I am neither an expert on
Holmes nor a legal philosopher, and those who have studied Holmes far

4. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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more than I continue to argue about exactly what he meant. Nonetheless,
because it remains subject to extensive debate, it is worth considering
briefly who the bad man is and why he is bad.
Holmes described the bad man as someone “who cares only for the
material consequences which such knowledge [of the law] enables him to
predict.”5 The bad man “cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practised by his neighbors.”6 In short, the bad man cares about the law
because of the sanctions imposed for violating it. Holmes contrasts the bad
man with the good man, “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”7 This good
man employs Hart’s “internal point of view” and obeys the law out of a
sense of obligation that is (at least partially) independent of the law’s
consequences.8
Why is the bad man bad? Holmes clearly could have engaged in the
same task of distinguishing law from morals or ethics without the bad man
figure. Moreover, the bad man label is strikingly normative. In part, it
seems that Holmes uses the bad man to highlight the compulsory nature of
regulation. Sanctions imposed by the threat of government force compel
obedience both from good men, who follow the law out of a sense of social
or moral obligation, and bad men, who follow the law simply because they
want to avoid paying a penalty or going to jail. Additionally, the bad man
does not respond to moral arguments—the fact that certain conduct is
unethical or inconsistent with societal norms does not matter to him.9 Thus,
in the context of advising future lawyers, Holmes instructs them that, for
the bad client, their advice must be framed in terms of consequences rather
than reasons.10 Finally, the bad man is selfish; he acts out of self interest,
not out of regard for the greater community.11 Importantly, however, the
bad man is not a criminal.12 Nor does he ignore the law—although Holmes

5. Holmes, supra note 1, at 993.
6. Id. at 992.
7. Id. at 993.
8. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of the Law (1961) (describing the internal
point of view).
9. As Judge Richard Posner convincingly argues, although the law overlaps with moral
principles, there is considerable difference between the two. The law does not enforce many
moral principles, and, at the same time, “the law prohibits or attaches sanctions to a great
deal of morally indifferent conduct.” Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1695
(1998).
10. “[O]ur friend the bad man . . . does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions,
but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in
fact.” Holmes, supra note 1, at 994.
11. William Twining suggests that the bad man employs a “user perspective.” William
Twining, Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997, 63
Brook. L. Rev. 189, 212 (1997).
12. In describing the bad man’s consequentialist analysis, Holmes explicitly “leav[es]
the criminal law on one side.” Holmes, supra note 1, at 994. Holmes later explains, “If the
typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep seated an organic
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indicates that the bad man may view legal sanctions as the price to be paid
for violating the law, he does not suggest that the bad man will fail to pay
that price.13
Despite the calculated use of the term “bad,” Holmes seems not to have
persuaded subsequent commentators, many of whom resist the
characterization.14 David Luban considers “the bad man [as] a realistic
picture of the usual corporate client of Holmes’s day.”15 Sandy Levinson
and J.M. Balkin reformulate the bad man as the self-reliant man, who does
not seem very bad at all.16 Catharine Peirce Wells describes the bad man as
an outsider, “someone who does not share in the ideals that the law
represents,” such as a “feminist,” a “gay activist,” or a “Moonie.”17 Law
and economics scholars embrace the bad man as the rational economic
actor.18 Still other commentators argue that the bad man is simply a
heuristic, a tool for examining the law from a specific and limited
perspective.19
I am not sure I agree with Holmes that the failure to second-guess legal
limits by imposing extralegal moral scrutiny makes someone bad. In my
view, the bad man can be understood as someone who lacks a moral
compass.20 In that case, the bad man must take the law as an independent
and arguably complete set of rules that constrain his conduct. In the
absence of an alternative moral viewpoint, the bad man uses morality

necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him by the
classical method of imprisonment.” Id. at 1002.
13. See, e.g., id. at 994 (“[T]he party taking another man’s property has to pay its fair
value as assessed by a jury, and no more.”).
14. Other commentators, however, claim that the bad man is truly bad, wicked, or evil.
See, e.g., Catharine Peirce Wells, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and William James: The Bad
Man and the Moral Life, in The Path of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 211, 224
(describing David Siepp’s characterization of Holmes’s bad man as “a real evildoer”).
15. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer, in The Path of the Law and Its
Influence, supra note 1, at 33, 43.
16. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, The “Bad Man,” the Good, and the SelfReliant, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 899 (1998) (describing the “self-reliant man”).
17. Wells, supra note 14, at 225.
18. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577, 1591 (2000) (describing the acceptance
by law and economics scholars of the rational bad man as the decision maker in their
analysis).
19. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Hidden Holmes: His Theory of Torts in History 4849 (1995) (describing Holmes as “advocat[ing] the ‘bad man’ heuristic . . . to facilitate
testing legal concepts and theories in the ‘dry light’ of experience”); Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 826-28 (1989) (describing Holmes’s
“heuristic purpose” as defined by the legal perspective “of a private lawyer counseling a
client”).
20. This terminology belongs to Jack Beermann. See Jack M. Beermann, Holmes’s Good
Man: A Comment on Levinson and Balkin, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 937, 941 (1998) (describing the
bad man’s lack of a “moral compass”). Alternatively, the bad man may have a moral
compass, but reject it as an authoritative guide for his actions. Thus, the bad man may lack
confidence in his ability to make moral judgments or may refuse to privilege his personal
moral views above those of society as reflected explicitly in existing law.
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neither to supplement legal constraints nor as a justification for ignoring
them.
Moreover, it is unclear that a moral compass aids in legal compliance.
Perhaps in a personal sense, we want people to be moral, but from a legal
perspective, it is not clear that having people do an individual cost-benefit
analysis is better than having them simply follow legal rules. Indeed, many
have argued that the value of a legal system lies in its ability to settle, albeit
not resolve, moral conflict. To the extent that morality enables one to
continue to defy a controversial rule with which one disagrees, its role in
the legal system is problematic, and commentators have struggled to defend
a role for moral analysis on this issue that does not undercut the integrity of
the legal system.21
An additional concern is the extent to which the bad man will be
constrained by legal sanctions. Some commentators have worried that, in
predicting the cost of disobeying the law, the bad man will not simply
calculate the cost of legal sanctions, but will further consider the likelihood
that those sanctions will be imposed.22 Robert Gordon terms this a
“restate[ment] . . . [of the Holmesian] ‘bad man’s’ view of legal rules as
prices discounted by sanctions—or, to reduce it still further, by the
probability of enforcement of sanctions.”23 Albert Altschulter has observed
that, under a strict reading of Holmes, it would appear that unenforced law
is not law at all.24
Although this reading of Holmes is plausible, I do not read Holmes as
incorporating the risk of nonenforcement into the bad man’s calculation.25
As Luban suggests, “There is no hint in Path or elsewhere that Holmes
understood that risk-benefit analysis by a genuinely bad man ‘who cares
only for the material consequences’ would consider enforcement
probabilities as well as enforcement outcomes.”26 Indeed, Luban argues
that such an interpretation would render Holmes’s bad man thesis
“preposterous.”27 I agree with Luban. As I read Holmes, the bad man is
21. Indeed, Mark DeWolfe Howe explains that the explicit reason for Holmes’s effort to
separate the law from morality was that “he wanted men to obey even those rules of law
which they believed to be unjust.” Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice
Holmes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 532 (1951).
22. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1291 (1998).
23. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1192 (2003).
24. Albert W. Altschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 353, 368-69 (1997).
25. See also Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in
The Path of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 158, 179 (explaining that Holmes is
predicting the law not from the bad man’s point of view about the probability of
enforcement, but from the perspective of courts and legislatures about the threat of legal
liability).
26. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s
The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1571 (1997) (quoting Oliver Wendel Holmes,
The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 171 (Harold J. Laski ed., 1920)).
27. Id.
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labeled “bad” because of his reasons for obeying the law, not his predicted
failure to do so. Moreover, rather than describing the expected cost to the
bad man of violating the law, Holmes describes legal liability as requiring
that the bad man make “compulsory payment” of “fair value.”28
In any event, law and economics tells us that the risk of nonenforcement
could, from a deterrence perspective, be addressed through modifications to
the sanction for noncompliance. If the bad man does factor in the
likelihood that he can get away with violating legal rules, society only need
increase the penalty for noncompliance to a sufficient level to compensate
for the probability of nonenforcement.29 Alternatively, society can impose
extra-compensatory penalties, such as punitive damages, for deliberate
violations of legal obligations.30
An additional and related concern is the bad man’s view of legal liability
as simply a price for noncompliance with the law. In his essay, Holmes
argues that, for the bad man, legal rules impose costs on certain types of
conduct but lack independent normative force. From the bad man’s point of
view, “what is the difference between being fined and being taxed a certain
sum for doing a certain thing?”31 Thus, a bad man may drive recklessly if
he is willing to pay for the cost of an accident. A supplier may breach a
contract if he can sell his product at a higher price, so long as he is willing
to pay damages to the first buyer.
Cynthia Williams criticizes this law-as-price approach for understating
the normative significance of the law and for implying that compliance with
the law is purely voluntary.32 In part, I believe that the Holmesian bad man
is designed to push our analysis on this issue. In the end, however, I think
Williams’s characterization is an overstatement. Even if legal rules carry
no normative force, the rational actor’s cost-benefit calculation is likely to
be richer than Williams suggests and, in most cases, weighed heavily in
favor of compliance. There are generalized effects to violating legal rules
systematically—reputational penalties, loss of goodwill, increased visibility
to potential regulators, and so forth. The potential contract breacher must
consider not just the efficiency of his case-specific breach, but the effect on
his future ability to enter into contracts with others. Although the bad man
may not consider the consequences of his legal violations on “the social-

28. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994.
29. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal Stud.
319, 324 (1996) (arguing that appropriate levels of deterrence will be achieved by setting the
penalty for misconduct equal to the social cost of that misconduct “adjusted for the
probability of nondetection”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs
and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & Econ. 133, 133 (1992)
(same).
30. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 29, at 348 (observing that punitive damages
can serve as a mechanism for adjusting penalties to reflect the probability of nondetection).
31. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994.
32. Williams, supra note 22, at 1269 (criticizing the “voluntaristic approach to law”
resulting from treating legal sanctions as prices).
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structuring function of law,”33 there is no reason for him to ignore the effect
of those violations on his own future dealings.
Moreover, I do not read Holmes to be making this argument.
Concededly, Holmes states that the significance of legal rules for the bad
man is limited to their consequences. The bad man, in Holmes’s view, does
not care to evaluate his actions in terms of some moral theory; for him, the
significance of legal rules is the disagreeable consequences associated with
their violation. But it is important to remember that this description of the
law is through the eyes of the bad man. Having defined the bad man as one
lacking a moral compass, Holmes correctly observes that the association of
a legal penalty with an action will not cause the bad man to condemn that
action as morally corrupt. Holmes does not, and I think would not, make
the broader claim that legal rules and sanctions have no independent moral
force to anyone. His essay explicitly avoids the question of whether one
can or should have an independent moral duty to obey the law, and the bad
man is, after all, in his terms, “bad.”
In addition to the question of whether and why the bad man is bad,
commentators have debated the utility of the bad man metaphor and the
validity of Holmes’s philosophical approach to the law, as embodied in the
bad man. Thus, for example, Henry Hart states that he is unable to see the
value of the bad man metaphor, “unless to make us more effective
counsellors of evil.”34 Stephen Perry, in contrast, argues that “the bad man
captured something fundamental about human nature” and that “in an
important sense people really are ‘bad men.’”35
Regardless of the broader debate about the bad man, which is too
extensive to detail here, commentators have suggested that the bad man is
of particular utility in understanding the corporation and its duty to obey the
law. Of particular relevance is the fact that corporations, like the bad man,
lack an internal moral compass. Because corporations are artificial entities,
it is difficult to identify a source of their moral obligations.36 As I have
argued elsewhere, there is no reason to believe that corporations share the
social, moral, or ethical obligations of natural persons.37 Moreover,
because corporations are composed of multiple constituencies with various
claims, moral and otherwise, one cannot readily look to individual

33. Id. at 1277.
34. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 932
(1951).
35. Perry, supra note 25, at 167-68.
36. At the core, this difficulty may stem from the reification of the corporation, which
leads to the conception of an independent entity with preferences and interests that may be
distinct from those of the individual participants in the enterprise. See, e.g., William A.
Klein, Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles 99 (1980)
(warning that reification of the corporation can be dangerous because it may cause us to
overlook the fact that “only individuals enjoy the benefits, or bear the burdens and the
responsibilities, of actions affecting other individuals”).
37. See Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate Governance
Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1091, 1099 (1997).
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corporate stakeholders as a source of corporate morality. Whether or not
human actors have ethical and moral obligations to obey the law,
corporations are more easily understood as amoral. As Daniel Fischel
explains,
A corporation . . . is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a
nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily
entered into for their mutual benefit. Since it is a legal fiction, a
corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the
same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having these
obligations.38

William Twining argues, “[I]s not the perspective of a large bureaucratic
corporation whose sole or primary aim is maximization of profit very close
to that of the ‘bad man’—amoral, rational, calculating, purposeful, pursuing
its own agenda?”39 Thus the bad man, with his nonexistent moral compass,
offers us a mechanism for understanding the duties imposed on amoral
corporations by the law.40
There are, of course, limitations to the analogy. One significant
difference between the corporation and the Holmesian bad man is the
corporation’s participation in the political process by which legal rules are
created, a subject that this essay will consider further in Parts III and IV. A
second difference is the significant role of the market as a constraint on
corporate decision making. The relationship between regulation and market
forces as constraints on corporate conduct is complex and beyond the scope
of this essay.41
II. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Despite the potential utility of the bad man metaphor for evaluating
corporate decision making, it has received little attention in corporate law
scholarship. The bad man has found his way into tort law, professional
responsibility, contracts, and many other areas, but not corporate law. The
exception is progressive corporate law scholarship.42
38. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259,
1273 (1982).
39. Twining, supra note 11, at 210.
40. It is tempting to extend the metaphor—identifying the recent misdeeds of corporate
officials such as Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, Bernard Ebbers, Dennis Kozlowski, and
many more—as the acts of the Holmesian bad man corporation. The analogy is misplaced—
the corporate misconduct involved was the misconduct of individual corporate actors who
were acting both criminally and in opposition to the interests of the corporate entity.
41. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Business and Its Environment 133 (3d ed. 2000)
(explaining the relationship between market and nonmarket activities, including regulation,
and their effect on corporate behavior); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977) (describing
various markets that constrain corporations).
42. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms),
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Progressive corporate law is characterized by its view that corporations
have obligations to non-shareholder stakeholders and the public generally,
and that these obligations include duties of fairness and morality that extend
beyond legal and contractual rules.43 Alternatively characterized as
corporate social responsibility (CSR), the scholarship finds its roots in
Merrick Dodd’s 1932 claim that corporate managers “should concern
themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general
public, as well as of the stockholders.”44 As The Economist has
characterized it, the CSR literature is premised on a “perceived tension
between private profit and public interest,” a tension that is simply
“regarded as self-evident.”45 Progressive scholars argue that corporations
have a responsibility to society to act as good citizens, and that this
responsibility should either be effectuated through voluntary ethical
behavior that extends beyond the corporation’s legal obligations46 or
through increased regulation.47

87 Va. L. Rev. 1279, 1295-97 (2001) (criticizing the “bad man’s calculus” in the context of
noting “the difficulties inherent in establishing a coherent, persuasive, and workable theory
of a corporation’s duty to obey the law”); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s
Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) The Business
Judgment Rule, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 799, 850-51 (1997) (describing corporations as “bad men”
for employing cost-benefit analysis); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in
the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L.
Rev. 477, 512 (1995) (arguing that the bad man approach “has led to a very low required
standard of behavior” in the context of corporate decision making).
43. See generally Progressive Corporate Law (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (series of
essays by a number of progressive corporate law scholars). The “progressive” label
overstates the commonality among the positions of these scholars. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 887-89 (1997) (book review)
(highlighting individual differences in approach).
44. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1145, 1156 (1932). Dodd’s article was a response to Adolf Berle’s article arguing that
corporate managers were trustees with an obligation to run the corporation in the best
interests of its shareholders. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1049 1074 (1931). Ultimately, Dodd largely yielded to Berle’s position. See
E. Merrick Dodd, Dimock and Hyde: Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations,
9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538, 547 (1942) (book review) (conceding that it was misleading to
consider managers as trustees for non-shareholder stakeholders).
45. The World According to CSR, The Good Company, Jan. 22, 2005, at 10, Economist,
Jan. 22-28, 2005.
46. See, e.g., David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate
Social Responsiveness, 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 41, 52 (1999) (defining corporate social
responsibility to include “meeting society’s expectations of proper business conduct that is
not necessarily codified (i.e., ethical responsibilities)”).
47. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581, 599 (2002)
(“Even if one assumes that a maximization of utility should be the end goal, government
intervention is often necessary to repair market defects and thereby to maximize utility.
Externalities, collective action problems, ‘prisoners’ dilemmas,’ inadequate information,
tragedies of the common, and natural monopolies may all result from market forces and can
make it impossible to maximize social utility. Thus, government regulation of corporations
is necessary even under a utilitarian social calculus.”).
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Progressive scholars, in particular, find the bad man metaphor a powerful
tool in criticizing existing corporate conduct that, although technically
legal, appears socially harmful. Corporations pollute the environment.
Corporations pay their employees (at least nonexecutive employees) too
little. Corporations manufacture dangerous products. These actions are
attributed to the corporation’s selfish objective of maximizing profit at the
expense of net social welfare.48
The attributed corporate greed is exacerbated by the fact that corporations
rely extensively on cost-benefit analysis. As Kent Greenfield and John
Nilsson explain, “[E]ven Oliver Wendell Holmes said that it was ‘bad men’
who made decisions based on cost-benefit analysis.”49 Perhaps the best
known example of a corporation being vilified for the use of cost-benefit
analysis is the Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.50 Thus, Marc
Galanter and David Luban describe the jury’s response upon learning of
Ford’s reliance on cost-benefit analysis as a desire to condemn “the
particular kind of wickedness displayed in Ford’s reluctance to recall the
exploding Pintos: it was greed, allowing one’s decision to be swayed by
the sheer magnitude of money.”51
The bad man offers some traction here. In part, the metaphor serves as a
rhetorical device by labeling amoral corporate decisions as selfish and
bad.52 It is precisely the absence of an independent moral constraint, and
the mere “technical” legal compliance, that commentators view as
problematic—the same characteristics that arguably render the bad man
bad.
Lawrence Mitchell argues that corporations are “morally
irresponsible; they are able to deflect moral responsibility for their
decisions to the command of law.”53 Joel Bakan criticizes corporations for
their “pathological pursuit of profit and power.”54 Bradley Wendell states
that Enron’s abuse of special purpose entities was “abetted by the
Holmesian bad man attitudes of lawyers and accountants, who in effect
agreed with Fastow that if the rules do not explicitly prohibit an act, it is
permissible.”55
In addition, if the corporation is a Holmesian bad man, it cannot be
trusted to act responsibly. Thus, progressive scholars argue that the law
48. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 42, at 502 (explaining that corporations are “dumping
pollutants, diluting baby food, or selling dangerous products” because corporate law defines
the corporate objective as self-interested profit maximization).
49. Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 42, at 850 n.207.
50. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
51. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1437 (1993).
52. Cf. Ernest L. Folk III, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15
S.C. L. Rev. 275, 307 (1963) (arguing that because most enterprises appeal to high
standards, “Holmes’ ‘bad man’ theory of law properly has little application to corporation
law”).
53. Mitchell, supra note 42, at 505.
54. Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (2004).
55. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167,
1224 (2005).
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should respond by rejecting the free market approach in favor of more
extensive regulation. If the corporation responds only to legal limits, those
limits must be more restrictive. Concededly, scholars have moved away
from a highly regulatory approach in favor of increased disclosure or
broader definitions of the corporation’s objectives. In the end, though, to
the extent that these approaches displace market-based contractual
solutions, they are still government-imposed restrictions on corporate
decisions.56
The bad man model operates as a double-edged sword, however, for
progressive corporate law scholarship. Whether corporations are to
increase their social responsibility voluntarily or on the basis of increased
regulation, the progressive argument essentially asks that they limit their
behavior in accordance with a set of additional social, moral, or ethical
obligations extending beyond existing law. But where is this set of
obligations to come from? Holmes highlights the distinction between moral
and legal obligations, but a corporation as an entity lacks an internal point
of view that can serve as a source of moral obligations.
The corporation cannot readily adopt the moral perspective of its
individual constituents.
Shareholders may define the corporation’s
objectives in broad terms57—and indeed, they sometimes include social
obligations within the corporate contract58—but they do not have the legal
authority to make operational decisions. As for officers and directors, those
with the authority to make corporate decisions, there is little reason to
believe their ethical views mirror those of society. Moreover, to the extent
that corporate officials impose their personal moral views on the
corporation, they abuse their fiduciary obligations as agents. Finally,
various corporate stakeholders may have differing moral perspectives.59 As
William James observed, there is no methodology for incorporating
pluralistic moral views into a single scale.60

56. See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of
Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev.
1189, 1238 (1991) (characterizing free market proponents as “shar[ing] Holmes’s bad man
perception of the law with respect to legal rules that restrict people’s ability to contract”).
57. The appropriate definition of the corporation’s objectives in terms of shareholder
primacy or furthering the interests of multiple stakeholders is beyond the scope of this essay.
For a more detailed consideration of the issue, see Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 637 (2006)
(advocating a broader measure of firm value than shareholder wealth).
58. Ben & Jerry’s, for example, was well known for donating 7.5% of corporate profits,
five times the business average, to philanthropy. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Two Dips: The
Gospel According to Ben & Jerry: Is Feel Good Capitalism Good for Charity?,
Philanthropy Mag., Oct. 1, 1997, http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/article.asp?article=
1375&paper=0&cat=148 (describing the company’s efforts to incorporate social values into
business operations).
59. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 57 (identifying varying interests and perspectives of
different corporate stakeholders).
60. William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in Essays in Pragmatism
65, 77 (1948).
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If the corporation cannot evaluate its conduct from an internal point of
view, it has no basis for weighing the social costs and benefits of its actions.
Accordingly, it has no choice but to view legal rules, which reflect societal
values and which have been implemented through democratic principles, as
the exclusive constraints on its decisions.
This then limits the scope of the progressive claim. If corporations have
a responsibility to society, that responsibility must be reflected in the
corporation’s legal obligations. If society views corporate conduct as
socially harmful, the solution is not to urge higher ethical standards, but to
prohibit objectionable behavior through bans on toxic dumping, minimum
wage laws, and consumer safety regulations. Similarly, corporate actions
that distort the market can be addressed through regulatory mechanisms
such as antitrust laws and truth-in-advertising requirements. Within legal
limits, corporations have the right to act selfishly by maximizing firm value.
From a static perspective, this analysis makes sense. If the corporation,
like the Holmesian bad man, is an outsider to the law, legal rules are the
appropriate mechanism for ensuring that the corporation acts in accordance
with societal values. Unlike the bad man, however, the corporation is not
external to the lawmaking process. Society does not impose legal rules
upon the corporation; corporations actively participate in the process of
creating, molding, and modifying those rules. The next section briefly
considers the nature and extent of corporate participation in the political
process.
The following section explores the implications of that
participation in the context of the Holmesian bad man.
III. CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Despite the fact that they lack the power to vote, corporations have long
been active participants in the political process. The role of corporations in
politics dates back to the turn of the century61 and is likely due to at least
four factors: (1) the increasing size and importance of corporations and
business generally following the industrial revolution and liberalization of
state corporate law; (2) the increasing role of regulation, which heightened
the importance of law for business; (3) the growth in national political
parties, which shifted and focused the process of political participation;62
and (4) the growing cost of political campaigns.
At the outset, corporate political activity consisted largely of money
donations—political contributions and even bribes. Regulation was a
response to revelations about the growing size and importance of these
donations. For example, corporate contributions comprised more than

61. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 Bus.
Law. 155, 158-59 (2005) (describing “American business history . . . as an ongoing cat-andmouse game between regulators . . . and business leaders”).
62. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1131-32 (2002) (describing
the growth and effect of national political parties).
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seventy percent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1904 campaign chest, including
contributions of $150,000 from J.P. Morgan Co. and $125,000 from
Standard Oil.63 The press reported allegations of bribes and extortion,
including, perhaps most famously, published letters from E.H. Harriman
stating that he had acquired influence in Washington by raising $200,000
for the Republican campaign.64
As Congress responded by barring direct contributions,65 corporations
developed a variety of alternatives. Political action committees (PACs)
allow corporations to make campaign contributions through funds that are
collected from employees and stockholders and segregated from the
corporate treasury. The formation and use of corporate PACs increased
dramatically in the late 1970s and continues to be an important area of
political spending. According to the Federal Election Commission, PAC
spending during the 2003-2004 election totaled $310.5 million.66
Currently, approximately forty percent of all PACs are corporate PACs,
although by most estimates, corporate PAC expenditures comprise only a
small percentage of total campaign spending.67
Soft money donations are donations made to the national political parties
rather than to the candidates themselves. Corporate soft money donations,
which were, for a time, unrestricted by regulation, exploded in the 1990s,
growing from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million during the 2000 election
campaign.68
Subsequently, Congress banned corporate soft money
donations in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).69
Although PAC expenditures and soft money donations have received the
majority of the attention directed to corporate political activity, such
expenditures are often dwarfed by lobbying expenses. Corporations spend
millions of dollars annually seeking political influence through lobbying.

63. Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal
Campaign Finance Law 3 (1988).
64. Id. at 9-10.
65. The first federal campaign finance law, the Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36,
34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)), barred federally
chartered corporations from making campaign contributions and barred all corporations from
making contributions in connection with an election for federal office. In addition,
disclosure regulations required political candidates and committees to report their
expenditures and the sources of their funding. Because the disclosure regulations contained
virtually no enforcement mechanism, and Congress did not require public disclosure of the
reports until the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456, there are
reasons to question the extent of compliance with the rules. Mutch, supra note 63, at 26-27.
66. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, PAC Activity Increases for 2004 Elections
(Apr.
13,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050412pac/PACFinal2004.html.
67. E.g., Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2
Bus. & Pol. 75 (2000) (reporting that corporate political action committee (PAC)
contributions account for about ten percent of congressional campaign spending).
68. Tom Hamburger, Broad Legal Attack May Undo Reform of Political Fund Raising,
Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1.
69. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 2
and 47 U.S.C.).
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In 2004, for example, ExxonMobil reported PAC disbursements of
$861,000, but disclosed that it had spent $7.7 million in the same year on
lobbying.70 Corporate lobbying has suddenly been highlighted by the
recent scandal in which Jack Abramoff pled guilty to conspiracy to bribe
public officials.71
Most recently, corporations have responded to the restrictions imposed
by the BCRA by making contributions to independent political committees,
known as “527 committees,” which in turn can make expenditures in
support of specific political issues. The committees are regulated by the
IRS as nonprofits and operate outside the scope of federal and state
campaign finance laws. One of the largest, the Republican Governors
Association, raised more than $18 million in 2004 and more than $9 million
in 2005, largely from corporate donors.72
Corporations also make direct expenditures in connection with issue
advocacy. One of the best known examples is the Harry and Louise
television advertisement created by the insurance industry, through the
Coalition for Health Insurance Choices,73 in an effort to defeat the Clinton
Administration’s plan for health care reform.74 Corporations also curry
favor with public officials through a variety of mechanisms—from offering
them transportation on corporate jets to sponsoring campaign dinners and
fund-raisers. In response to the restrictions imposed by the BCRA, for
example, many prominent corporate officials assisted the candidates in the
2004 election by “bundling” the contributions of individual donors.75
Despite the extensive regulatory restrictions on corporate political
activity that have existed for a century and that continue to expand, as the
70. ExxonMobil, 2004 Corporate Citizenship Report 45 (2004), available at
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/ccr04_fullreport.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Brody Mullins et al., Capitol Offense: Guilty Plea by Lobbyist Raises
Prospect of Wider Investigation, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (describing Jack Abramoff’s
guilty plea and a government investigation into the possibility of more widespread lobbying
corruption).
72. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Silent Partners: Republican Governors Association,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/profile.aspx?act=dir&sub=1&cycle=2006&id=479 (last
visited Nov. 7, 2006).
73. SourceWatch,
Coalition
for
Health
Insurance
Choices,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Coalition_for_Health_Insurance_Choices (last
visited Nov. 7, 2006); see Gary D. Wekkin, The “Blame Game”: What Went Wrong with
Health Care Reform, 5 White House Stud. 53, 53 (2005), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KVD/is_1_5/ai_n15927746 (stating that the
health care industry spent $30 million on the Harry and Louise advertising campaign).
74. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) also reduced corporate ability to
engage in “issue advocacy” by broadening the definition of electioneering communications
and prohibiting corporations from making such communications except through segregated
funds.
75. See Tim Shorrock & Michael Scherer, Bundles of Influence, Mother Jones, May 1,
2004, http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2004/05/04_405.html (describing fundraising efforts and political influence wielded by top republican bundlers including Pfizer
CEO Henry “Hank” McKinnell); see also Oliver Staley, That’s a Bundle—1 Ranger Can
Deliver Many Checks, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Aug. 27, 2004, at A1 (describing
Republican Party rangers and pioneers).
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summary above indicates, corporations persist in finding new ways to exert
political influence. At base, the explanation for this is simple: Political
activity is an integral component of a corporation’s business strategy.
Modern corporations operate in an environment pervaded by regulation.
Shaping and responding to that regulation is an element of a corporation’s
operational strategy as much as marketplace competition.
Telecommunications companies, for example, such as Qwest, Global
Crossing, and WorldCom, have been criticized for spending millions of
dollars in politics during the late 1990s, at the same time that the
companies’ financial operations were unsustainable and they were engaged
in widespread accounting frauds.76 Regulation, however, is critical to the
telecommunications industry.77 Rate regulation, freedom of entry, and
access to the internet are among the most significant issues affecting a
company’s business plan and the profitability of its operations.78 The
importance of regulation to the industry was borne out by the passage of the
landmark 1996 federal telecommunications law.79 Among other things, by
reducing the scope of federal regulation, the statute opened the door to
extensive state regulatory efforts—from 1993 through the first half of 2005,
there were 5187 bills introduced in state legislatures relating to
telecommunications issues.80 A rewrite of the federal statute is pending,
leaving open the extent and form of further deregulation.81
Moreover, corporate political participation is effective. Corporations are
able to exert substantial influence on regulatory policy through their
political activities and donations. Although widely criticized as special
interest legislation, examples of statutory responses to corporate political
pressure abound. Enron’s political contributions are widely credited with
enabling it to eliminate protected energy monopolies.82 The enactment of
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,83 sometimes called “the
Mickey Mouse law,” is attributed to extensive lobbying by the Walt Disney
Company, which stood to lose copyright protection for Mickey Mouse in

76. Bruce F. Freed et al., Ctr. for Political Accountability, The Green Canary: Alerting
Shareholders and Protecting Their Investments 11-13 (2005), available at
www.politicalaccountability.net/files/GreenCanaryFinalA.pdf.
77. John Dunbar, Former Bells Dial Up Big Numbers in Statehouses: SBC Is No. 1 in
Both Lobbying and Contributions, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, Sept. 29, 2005,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=744.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (basing this finding on “a search of the LexisNexis database of state legislative
activity”).
81. Id.
82. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L.
Rev. 1275, 1278-79 (2002) (describing Enron’s extensive and successful political efforts to
eliminate energy monopolies).
83. The Act extended copyright protection for an additional twenty years for works still
protected in 1998. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2000).
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2003.84 Recent lobbying efforts by Hewlett-Packard Co. resulted in tax law
changes that will save the company millions of dollars by reducing the tax
Political
on profits from the company’s foreign subsidiaries.85
heavyweights like FedEx have multi-decade histories of successfully
influencing legislation.86
Although the foregoing analysis is only a brief summary of the nature
and effect of corporate political activity, it demonstrates that corporations
cannot be viewed as outsiders to the legal system. Corporations are not
simply constrained by society’s legal rules; they play a substantial role in
shaping the rules by which they are governed. What is the significance of
this role for Holmesian analysis? How should the lack of moral
accountability affect the conduct of the politically powerful bad man? The
answers to these questions are explored below.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL BAD MAN
For the individual Holmesian bad man, existing legal constraints are
externally imposed and largely immutable. Indeed, as Twining has
observed, “[f]or Hart, as well as Holmes, for the purpose of detached
description, it is useful to conceive of law in terms of other people’s
power.”87 The bad man metaphor is based on the premise that law consists
of a set of externally imposed consequences—this is the reason that law
restricts the actions of the bad man. The law represents, for the bad man,
the power behind the statute to impose sanctions upon those who violate
it.88
For corporations, however, the legal rules are themselves subject to
change. How does this affect the bad man approach to understanding the
law? And, in the context of The Path of the Law, how should lawyers
counsel politically active corporations?
These questions can be answered in several ways. One possibility is that
the bad man metaphor simply does not apply to corporations. Corporations
are not outsiders, but insiders; the legal rules with which they must comply
84. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 471, 483 (2003).
85. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street, Wash. Post, June 22,
2005, at A1.
86. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 Vand.
L. Rev. 1495 (2005) (describing FedEx’s political activities in connection with several
legislative issues). For example, as a fledgling business struggling to survive in the late
1970s, FedEx embarked on an extensive political campaign and was so visibly instrumental
in the effort to deregulate air cargo that Washington insiders termed the resulting statute
“The Federal Express Act.” See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal
History, 30 Transp. L.J. 235, 335 (2003) (describing the name as resulting from “the speed
by which [the bill] flew through Capitol Hill and the identity of its principal sponsor”).
87. Twining, supra note 11, at 198.
88. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, The Score as Contract: Private Law and the Historically
Informed Performance Movement, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1589, 1609 (1999) (explaining that
under the positivist view as reflected in Holmes, “one obeys a statute because of the power
behind the statute”).
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are a product of their own actions. As such, corporations do not share the
perspective of the bad man. Corporations do not necessarily view legal
rules as the product of someone else’s power; instead, the rules may be
sources of power for the corporation itself. Indeed, legal rules can be a
means by which one corporation constrains the activities of its
competitors.89
Although this interpretation of Holmes is plausible, there are reasons to
reject it. First, this Symposium is about Holmes and the bad man, and it
would be poor form to conclude that these themes are irrelevant to the study
of corporate law. More importantly, the mutability of legal rules was well
known to Holmes. Holmes explicitly observed, in The Path of the Law,
how readily the law could be changed: “We do not realize how large a part
of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the
public mind.”90 Corporations in the late 1800s, like corporations today,
figured prominently in shaping and changing the law. As Gordon argues,
Holmes was well aware that the corporate lawyer of his era was “an active
shaper of [the law], a drafter of bills favoring his clients and a lobbyist to
push them through legislatures.”91 Indeed, Congress passed the first
campaign finance law, the Tillman Act, in 1904, in an effort to reduce
corporate political influence as a response to reported scandals at the turn of
the century.92
A second possibility is that the bad man metaphor demonstrates the
problematic nature of corporate political influence. Because the corporation
lacks an internal moral perspective, it, like the bad man, is constrained only
through legal limits. Those legal limits define the corporation’s objective
function. Indeed, corporate law sets forth the corporation’s purpose as the
maximization of firm value subject to applicable legal rules. The
corporation’s effort to challenge legal limits may be seen as an illegitimate
attempt to privilege the goal of profit maximization over those legal limits
that qualify this very goal. As such, political activism is simply ultra vires,
beyond the corporation’s authority. This argument is strengthened by the
bad man’s normative status. If the bad man acts selfishly and without
reference to societal interests, his influence on the political process may be
destructive.
Robert Reich makes an argument along these lines. Reich argues that the
very amorality that relieves a corporation from social responsibility
89. The Noerr/Pennington doctrine, for example, excludes a corporation’s application
for patent protection from challenge under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., James R. Atwood,
Securing and Enforcing Patents: The Role of Noerr/Pennington, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc’y 651 (2001). The doctrine is based on the Noerr and Pennington cases, Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
90. Holmes, supra note 1, at 998.
91. Robert W. Gordon, Law as a Vocation: Holmes and the Lawyer’s Path, in The Path
of the Law and Its Influence, supra note 1, at 7, 14.
92. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1243,
1245-47 (1999) (describing the corporate role in politics in the late 1800s and early 1900s).
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delegitimizes its role in politics. According to Reich, corporations cannot
claim that legal compliance fully meets their social responsibilities while
simultaneously seeking to modify the social policies reflected in current
law. He concludes that, as a result, corporations have “a social
responsibility to refrain from politics.”93
Although Reich’s argument has some appeal, looking to Holmes as
support for regulating corporate political activity is of limited value.
Corporate political activity has been extensively regulated, starting with the
Tillman Act and continuing most recently with the BCRA’s prohibition on
soft money donations. Despite this regulation, corporations continue to
participate actively in the lawmaking process, and the enactment of
increased regulation simply generates innovative new approaches such that,
while the methodology may change, corporations continue to participate.
As I have argued elsewhere,94 it is naive to believe that corporate political
participation can be eliminated through regulation; regulation is simply too
important to business. As a result, it is more productive to consider whether
the bad man offers a basis for evaluating the corporation’s role in the
political process and guidance for the lawyer representing a corporate client
in that process.
Applying the bad man metaphor to corporate participation in the political
process is, of course, a stretch. The Path of the Law is a court-centered
approach to the law. In particular, The Path of the Law focuses on the role
of lawyers in advising clients as to what courts will do. The choice
presented by Holmes to the bad man, through the voice of his counsel, is to
comply with the law or to violate the law and face the “‘disagreeable
consequences.’”95
Political activity offers the bad man a third option—to attempt to change
the law with which he does not wish to comply. Although legal change can
be accomplished through litigation, it is more likely to occur through the
legislative process, and legislation is quite different from adjudication. The
lawyer’s role differs as well. As Thomas Grey observes, the bad man does
not require a lawyer to deal with the legislature, he can hire a lobbyist who
does not need a law license. Nonetheless, lawyers represent clients not just
in understanding the law, but also in changing it.
A comprehensive assessment of the relevance of The Path of the Law in
understanding legislation is beyond the scope of this essay, although it
would certainly be worthwhile to extend Holmes’s insights beyond the
common law realm. In the remainder of this essay, I sketch out a few ways
in which the bad man figure and his purpose—to illuminate the distinction
between law and morality—are of value in understanding the legislative
process and the role of corporations in that process.

93. Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 Cal.
Mgmt. Rev. 8, 10 (1998).
94. Fisch, supra note 86, at 1558-63.
95. Holmes, supra note 1, at 994.
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Scholars offer a variety of models of the political process, but at opposite
ends of the spectrum are civic republicanism and some form of public
choice theory. Civic republicanism conceives of lawmakers as publicregarding, viewing “legislatures as forums for public deliberation and civic
virtue.”96 As Jody Freeman explains, “[C]ivic republicanism portrays
government as a moral force for the common good.”97 Public choice, in
contrast, rejects the premise that the legislative process seeks to implement
some concept of the public good.98 According to public choice theory,
interest groups use politics toward their selfish ends, and interest group
factors such as size, cohesiveness, and stakes determine the extent of their
political power.
Holmes’s bad man fits within the framework of public choice. Public
choice theory is based on the expectation that at least some of the
participants in the political process will be bad men. Public choice accepts
that political participants act largely to further their private objectives;
selfishness characterizes interest group behavior.
Holmes himself
recognized the role of interest groups in the political process,
acknowledging that “[t]he more powerful interests must be more or less
reflected in legislation.”99 Moreover, public choice highlights Holmes’s
claim about the separation of law and morals. In Holmes’s world, law does
not reflect the common good.100 Holmes warned that “it is certain that
many laws have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that some are
enforced now, which are condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the
time.”101 Rather than serving the public good, Holmes describes the law as
serving the “social end which the governing power of the community has
made up its mind that it wants.”102
Of course, the normative status of the bad man may give us pause—do
we really want bad men to be making the law? One response is that, even
within a public choice framework, community values and the common good
place limits on legislative power. Holmes explained that although the limits
of legislative power were not coextensive with a system of morals, the law
was at least limited by some principles of morality. There are some laws,
according to Holmes, that a legislature “would not dare to enact . . . because

96. Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 75, 98 (1996).
97. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 562
(2000).
98. Id. at 561. The statement in the text is a simplification; the precise definition of
public choice theory is a matter of some dispute. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 12 (1991) (stating that the
definition of public choice “is itself sharply disputed”).
99. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Summary of Events: Great Britain: The Gas-Stokers’
Strike, 7 Am. L. Rev. 582, 583 (1873).
100. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 997 (identifying the “fallacy . . . that the only force at
work in the development of the law is logic”).
101. Id. at 993.
102. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in Collected Legal
Papers, supra note 26, at 210, 225.
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the community would rise in rebellion and fight.”103 A second argument is
that just because the bad man acts selfishly does not mean that his
objectives are inconsistent with the public good. Corporations reflect the
interests of a variety of stakeholders who have an interest in regulation,
including stakeholders whose views might not be conveyed to lawmakers
on an individual basis.104 To the extent that those interests are fairly
represented, the corporation’s involvement may make the legislative
process better informed and, in some sense, more democratic. The third
and perhaps most powerful response is to recognize that Holmes was a
positivist. His purpose in describing the separation of law and morals was
to help us understand what the law is, not to argue for what it should be.
And Holmes’s description offers powerful support that we cannot
accurately understand the legislative process without incorporating the bad
man perspective.
And what about the lawyer representing the politically active bad man
and, in particular, the politically active corporation? What lessons should
he take from Holmes? First, Holmes’s analysis of how to counsel the bad
man applies with equal force to political activity. It is of little value to
advise a corporation that it is immoral or unethical to engage in political
activity, as demonstrated by corporate efforts to develop new strategies for
political participation in light of increased regulatory restrictions. If market
forces demand political activism, the corporation will respond. On the
other hand, the bad man cares for the consequences of his actions and, with
respect to political activity, the professional may assist the corporation in
fully understanding the consequences of proposed regulatory changes.
In particular, corporate lawyers today face the challenge of
counterbalancing the short term perspective that has the potential to bias
corporate decisions. For example, when U.S. automakers lobbied in
opposition to mandatory fuel efficiency regulations, corporate officials were
acting out of an honest conviction that the continued manufacture of large
cars was good for their companies.105 In retrospect, the decision appears to
have been misguided—limited resources would and did eventually lead
customers to demand more fuel efficient vehicles regardless of the legal
rules, and Ford and General Motors have consequently suffered in the
marketplace.106 Effective representation might have demonstrated to the

103. Holmes, supra note 1, at 993.
104. David Baron has described the mobilization by corporations of interested
stakeholders such as employees and customers as “rent chains.” See Baron, supra note 41, at
223 (explaining the concept of “rent chains”).
105. Donald O. Mayer, Corporate Governance in the Cause of Peace: An Environmental
Perspective, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 585, 622-25 (2002) (describing extensive lobbying by
the U.S. auto industry against mandatory fuel efficiency regulation). Automakers believed
that customers wanted larger vehicles and that the higher profit margins on these vehicles
would benefit both shareholders and employees. Id. at 623-24 (explaining the rationale for
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corporations that their legislative agenda was inconsistent with their longterm corporate interests. Similarly, ill-advised political activism can
irreparably damage a corporation’s reputation—an effect of which the
corporation may be unaware.107
A second lesson for the corporate lawyer is to identify his or her client
correctly. As the recent corporate governance scandals illustrate, corporate
officials may themselves be bad men who seek to further their selfish
interests at the expense of the corporations of which they are fiduciaries.108
Corporate lawyers who are hired by those bad men may come to identify
with them and to defend their objectives rather than protecting the
corporation’s own selfish interests. Market pressures may lead corporate
lawyers to be sycophants, unwilling to challenge the objectives of those
executives responsible for retention decisions. But the lawyers who aid or
accede to the misdeeds of corporate managers betray their clients as well as
themselves. As Holmes observes at the end of The Path of the Law,
happiness cannot be purchased simply by being a wealthy corporate
lawyer.109
Finally, the lawyer for the politically active corporation should facilitate
the corporation’s evaluation of the effects of its political role by increasing
transparency and accountability both within and without the corporate
structure. Gordon criticizes Holmes for urging lawyers to be “passive
instruments [of their] clients’ ends rather than active forces to help refigure
and transform those ends.”110 But too often corporate decisions break down
because of failures in process—failures that counsel can address. With
respect to corporate political activity, some critics have argued that
corporations often take political positions that are internally inconsistent or
obviously contrary to their long-term interests because of deficiencies in the
manner in which political activism is disclosed and debated within the
corporation.111 Political contributions are generally not disclosed to the
board or shareholders, nor are political expenditures generally subject to
oversight as part of a corporation’s internal controls. The lack of oversight
makes it difficult for corporate decision makers and stakeholders to evaluate
the costs and benefits of political activity. At a minimum, a lawyer can
assist his or her client in implementing procedures to conduct an
appropriate cost-benefit analysis.
A first step in the process is disclosure. Shareholders introduced a record
number of proposals in the past proxy season calling for increased corporate
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/02/08/salvaging_th
e_auto_industry/ (describing how U.S. companies are lagging behind their foreign
competitors with respect to the manufacture of hybrid vehicles).
107. See Freed et al., supra note 76, at 7.
108. See generally Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights
Under the First Amendment, 91 Yale L.J. 235 (1981) (identifying the risk that managers will
pursue their political interests at the expense of the shareholders).
109. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 1009.
110. Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 (1997).
111. See, e.g., Freed et al., supra note 76, at 4.
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disclosure of political spending.112 Unfortunately, campaign finance laws
have often driven corporate political activity underground as corporations
are forced to act through conduits such as trade associations, 527
committees, and so forth. As a result, corporate political activity is
disguised both from corporate stakeholders and the general public. I have
argued elsewhere that greater transparency serves both the interests of the
corporation and of society.113 As Holmes explained, “When you get the
dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his
teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”114
CONCLUSION
Although the Holmesian bad man may or may not be all that bad, many
believe that the corporation is the quintessential bad man. The bad man’s
lack of an internal point of view and his characterization of the law as a set
of constraints limiting his pursuit of selfish objectives seem appropriately to
describe the relationship between corporations and the legal system.
Corporate decision making is largely focused on maximization of firm
value or shareholder wealth within the constraints imposed by law, posing a
challenge to those who counsel a greater role for ethical or moral
considerations.
The challenge is increased by the active participation of corporations in
the political process. For corporations, legal rules are not externally
imposed constraints, but tools that can be modified. This leads to an
apparent paradox in that corporations claim that legal compliance is the
equivalent of social responsibility, yet, at the same time, they are able to
control the legal constraints that define their obligations to society. Thus,
the politically active bad man poses a challenge for Holmesian analysis.
Rather than frustrating the bad man analogy or offering a basis for
condemning corporate political activity, Holmes’s ideas suggest that the
politically active bad man fits comfortably within a public choice analysis
of the political process. Accepting, as Holmes did, the role of the bad man
in the legal system illuminates the legislative process and explains, in part,
the gap between law and morality. Moreover, it is unclear that the selfish
political activism of the bad man is more detrimental to societal interests
than the activism of the good man who acts from an inner-directed sense of
morality. The task for future scholarship, in incorporating Holmes into an
analysis of the political process, is to come to grips with the bad man’s role
and to consider more fully the implications of that role for his lawyer and
for society.
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